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Abstract— IP fast reroute (IPFRR) mechanisms are efficient in 
providing protection against link or router failure by invoking 
locally determined backup paths. But in the presence of a 
transient network failure, the path oscillates between backup and 
original paths, causing frequent packet out-of-order arrivals at a 
TCP receiver. Duplicate acknowledgments (DUP_ACKs) 
generated by the receiver will then trigger unnecessary TCP 
congestion control at the sender. In this paper, we propose a novel 
yet simple algorithm called duplicate acknowledgement 
suppression (DAS) for enhancing the TCP performance in the 
presence of IPFRR. DAS only requires a minor modification to 
the TCP implementation at the receiver side while leaving the 
sender intact. The key idea is to use the time-to-live field of an 
out-of-order packet to infer the cause of its out-of-order arrival. If 
that is deemed due to a transient network failure, no DUP_ACK 
will be generated. Simulation results show that our DAS 
algorithm yields noticeable goodput improvement. 
Keywords-IP fast reroute (IPFRR); Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP); packet out-of-order. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Large-scale deployments of loss-sensitive Internet services 
require a disruption time as short as tens of milliseconds in IP 
networks [1]. To address this challenge, the technique known 
as IP fast reroute (IPFRR) was proposed [2]. The basic idea is 
that a router locally reroutes the affected traffic onto a pre-
calculated backup path as soon as a failure is detected. Various 
schemes for finding efficient backup paths have been proposed 
[2-9]. No matter which scheme to use, a fast failure detection 
protocol is essential. To this end, bidirectional failure detection 
protocol [10] and fast hellos [11-12] have been designed. 
When a router with IPFRR detects a failure, it immediately 
reroutes the affected traffic onto the backup path. But it does 
not immediately notify other routers in the network of the 
failure until a pre-defined hold down timer expires. If the hold 
down timer expires and the failure persists (as shown in Fig. 
1(a)), the failure is deemed persistent and is then announced to 
other routers in the network. Based on the specific routing 
protocol used, the network re-convergence takes place for 
finding a new set of paths to bypass the failed component. 
During the re-convergence, micro-loops can be developed 
because of temporary inconsistencies [2] between the routers’ 
forwarding tables. To avoid packet loss due to micro-loops, the 
affected traffic is rerouted to the (converged) new path only 
when the network re-convergence completes. If the failure is 
recovered before the hold down timer expires (as shown in Fig. 
1(b)), the failure is deemed transient. The affected traffic is 
rerouted back to the original path without triggering network 
re-convergence. It was reported in [9] that the majority of 
network failures are transient, with 46% of them last less than 
one minute and 86% less than ten minutes. The main causes of 
transient failures include router crash or reboot, line-card 
failure or reset, routine maintenance, etc. In this paper, we are 
interested in enhancing the TCP performance during a transient 
failure. 
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Figure 1.  Procedures for handling a network failure in IPFRR. 
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Figure 2.  Packet out-of-order problem due to the path difference. 
Although IPFRR improves the routing stability by not 
triggering network re-convergence during transient network 
failures, traffic rerouting can lead to packet out-of-order 
problem. We illustrate this using the example network in Fig. 2, 
where the pre-calculated backup path for link A-C is A-B-C. 
When a (transient) failure at link A-C occurs, the affected 
packets are rerouted from A-C to A-B-C. Note that this 
rerouting is from a shorter path to a longer one. Assume that 
the original path A-C is recovered before the hold down timer 
expires. Then the traffic on A-B-C will be rerouted back to A-C. 
This second rerouting is from a longer path to a shorter one. It 
(b) Transient network failure. 
(a) Persistent network failure. 
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is likely that packets sent (early) along A-B-C may arrive at the 
receiver later than packets sent (late) along A-C, resulting in 
out-of-order arrivals. Note that for each out-of-order packet, 
the TCP receiver generates a duplicate acknowledgment 
(DUP_ACK) and sends it back to the TCP sender. Upon 
receiving three DUP_ACKs in a row, the sender will undergo a 
fast retransmit [13], where a “lost” packet is retransmitted and 
the sending rate is halved. Indeed, this fast retransmit is not 
necessary and we call it a false fast retransmit. If there are 
many false fast retransmits in the network, the TCP 
performance/throughput will be lowered. 
To the best of our knowledge, the above false fast 
retransmit problem has not been studied under the context of 
IPFRR. To address this problem, we propose a duplicate 
acknowledgement suppression (DAS) algorithm in this paper. 
With DAS, when an out-of-order packet arrives (as detected by 
the TCP sequence number gap), the TCP receiver examines the 
time-to-live (TTL) field in the packet (IP datagram) header, 
and compares it with the last-received in-order packet. If there 
is an increase in TTL, which serves as a strong indication of 
path switch from backup (longer) to original (shorter) in 
IPFRR, DUP_ACK is suppressed. Although packet out-of-
order could also be triggered by other events, e.g. packet loss 
due to buffer overflow or transmission error, it is unlikely to be 
accompanied by a change/increase in TTL value. A distinct 
feature of our DAS algorithm is simplicity and ease of 
implementation. Indeed, only a minor modification to the TCP 
receiver implementation is required while the sender is kept 
untouched.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we formally present the DAS algorithm. In Section III, the 
performance of the DAS algorithm is studied by simulations.  
In Section IV, we analyze the DAS algorithm under some 
specific situations. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.  
II. DUPLICATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT SUPPRESSION 
Each IP datagram contains a time-to-live (TTL) field in its 
header. The initial TTL value is set by the sending host 
(sender), and all packets sent from this host will have the same 
initial TTL value. At each router hop, the value of TTL will be 
reduced by one. If TTL is equal to zero, the router will discard 
the packet to prevent possible routing loops.  
The TTL field in the IP header has been shown to be 
reliable for detecting route changes [14]. If there is no path 
change, packets from the same sender to the same receiver will 
always have the same (residual) TTL value. If there is a path 
change and there is a difference in path length, the TTL value 
of packets following different paths will be different. Note that 
with IPFRR, the backup path is generally longer than the 
original path because the original path is usually found using 
the shortest path routing algorithm. Accordingly, the (residual) 
TTL value of the packets carried by the backup path will be 
smaller than that of the packets carried by the original path. 
To address the false fast retransmit problem illustrated by 
the example in Fig. 2, a duplicate acknowledgement 
suppression (DAS) algorithm is designed. With DAS, a TCP 
receiver monitors the TTL value of each packet received. 
When an out-of-order packet arrives (as indicated by a 
sequence number gap in the TCP byte stream), its TTL 
(denoted as current_ttl) is compared with that of the last-
received in-order packet (or last_in_order_ttl). If there is an 
increase in TTL, the current packet has traversed a shorter 
distance, which is deemed due to a path switch from backup to 
original. Accordingly, no DUP_ACK is generated and the 
receiver sets its status flag DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS to 1. When 
an in-order packet arrives, we reset DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS to 
0 and last_in_order_ttl = current_ttl.  
The DAS algorithm can be summarized by the following 
pseudo codes. 
1: Initialize the status flag DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 0. 
2: for each packet received 
3:     current_ttl = the TTL value in the packet. 
4:     if (the packet is out of order) 
5:         if((current_ttl> last_ in_order _ttl)  
            && (DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 0))  
6:                 No DUP_ACK is generated; 
                DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 1. 
7:         else if ((current_ttl > last_ in_order _ttl) 
            && (DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 1)) 
8:                 No DUP_ACK is generated. 
9:         else if ((current_ttl = last_ in_order _ttl)  
            && (DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 1)) 
10:                 DUP_ACK is generated as usual; 
                DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 0. 
11:         end if 
12:     end if 
13:     if (the packet is in-order) 
14:         DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS = 0. 
        last_ in_order _ttl = current_ttl. 
15:     end if 
16: end for 
The rest of TCP implementation at the receiver remains 
unchanged. In particular, DAS can properly handle the packet 
out-of-order arrival caused by other events. When an out-of-
order packet arrives and there is no change in TTL, it implies 
that the packet out-of-order arrival is triggered by other events. 
A DUP_ACK is generated as usual, and 
DUP_ACK_SUPPRESS is set to 0. In Section IV, we show 
that our DAS algorithm can correctly handle both types of 
packet out-of-order events.  
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III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 
 To evaluate the proposed DAS algorithm, we implement 
DAS in NS2 version 2.34, and compare the performance of 
TCP NewReno with and without DAS.  Two networks shown 
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are simulated. The pre-determined backup 
paths are highlighted in the corresponding figures, which can 
be found by, e.g. LFA [4]. It should be noted that our DAS 
algorithm is independent of the backup path finding algorithm 
used. For simplicity, all the links in Figs. 2 & 3 are set to 100 
Mb/s with a one-way propagation delay of 5ms. The router 
buffer size is set to be sufficiently large to avoid buffer 
overflow. For TCP, we assume the sender always has data to 
send and with a maximum segment/packet size of 512 bytes. 
We use goodput, the amount of successfully delivered in-order 
bytes, as our performance metric. 
For the network in Fig. 2, we measure the performance of 
one single TCP connection between S and R. The simulation 
lasts for 11 seconds. The transient failure at link A-C occurs at 
t=3 second and is recovered at t=8 second. As expected, 
NewReno with DAS outperforms plain NewReno, achieving 
an improvement of up to 30.4%, where the average goodputs 
without and with DAS are 19931 Kb/s and 15280 Kb/s, 
respectively.  
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Figure 3.  #-shaped network for simulation. 
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Figure 4.  Goodput improvement vs. the number of observed TCP connection. 
Based on the network shown in Fig. 3, a more general 
scenario is considered, where multiple TCP connections and 
background traffic are simulated. Specifically, there are four 
pairs of end hosts in the #-shaped network,  S0/R0, S1/R1, S2/R2 
and S3/R3. There are n (1≤ n ≤ 10) TCP connections between S0 
and R0, and 10 TCP connections between the other three pairs 
of end hosts. The latter functions as the background traffic 
generators. Each simulation run lasts for 6 seconds. The 
transient failure at link A-C occurs at time t and lasts for 2 
seconds, where t is uniformly distributed between 2 and 4 
seconds. For each value of n, statistics from 15 simulation runs 
with different values of t are collected. For a fair comparison, 
the same random number seed is used for both NewReno with 
and without DAS algorithm.  
Fig. 4 shows the percentage improvement in TCP goodput 
as a result of using DAS, versus the number of TCP 
connections (n) between S0 and R0. We can see that the 
percentage improvement decreases with the TCP connection 
number. This is because the fraction of the TCP connections 
that would suffer from false fast retransmit decreases with the 
total number of TCP connections. 
IV. CASE BASED ANALYSIS 
In our simulation study above, we only consider packet 
out-of-order arrivals introduced by the path switch from 
backup to original. In practice, packet out-of-order triggered by 
other events is unavoidable. In this section, we use a few 
designed examples to demonstrate how our DAS reacts to real 
out-of-order packet arrivals while the path is switching from 
backup to original. 
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Figure 5.  Example for case based analysis. 
Consider the example shown in Fig. 5. Let the router that 
detects an adjacent failure be router_d. Without loss of 
generality, we assume the packets arrived at router_d are in the 
correct order, and the failure is recovered between the 
transmission of pkt4 and pkt5. In other words, pkt0, pkt1, pkt2, 
pkt3, pkt4 and some packets transmitted before are carried by 
the backup path, and the packets following pkt4 will be carried 
by the shorter original path. 
Assume that three packets pkt5, pkt6 and pkt7 arrive at the 
TCP receiver R out of order, as shown in Fig. 6 (a). Since the 
out-of-order packet arrivals are caused by the path switch in 
IPFRR, no DUP_ACK will be generated with our DAS. 
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Figure 6.  Out-of order packet arrivals at the TCP receiver. 
We next study the process of DAS on a real packet out-of-
order arrival with two examples, as shown in Figs. 6 (b) & (c), 
respectively. In Fig. 6 (b), assume that pkt1 is lost during the 
transmission on the backup path. Accordingly, the packets 
following it arrive at R out of order. Although three packets 
received before, i.e., pkt5, pkt6 and pkt7, are also out-of-order, 
our DAS can differentiate the reasons of their out-of-order 
arrivals based on the TTL values. For the packets following 
pkt1, the most-recently-received in-order packet is pkt0, and 
thus there is no change in TTL. With our DAS, it can be 
inferred that such packet out-of-order arrivals are caused by 
events other than the path switch. Therefore, a DUP_ACK (i.e. 
ack0) should be generated as usual. 
In Fig. 6 (c), we consider a lost packet, i.e. pkt5, on the 
original path. The packets following pkt5 arrive at R out-of-
order. Since these packet out-of-order arrivals are mixed with 
the false ones due to the path switch, our DAS cannot 
distinguish them immediately. However, after all the packets 
delayed by the path switch are received, the implementation at 
the receiver will go back to normal: a DUP_ACK (i.e., ack5) is 
generated upon receiving an out-of-order packet.  
From the above case analysis, we can see that our DAS can 
process real packet out-of-order arrivals correctly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
IPFRR mechanisms can effectively improve the routing 
stability by not triggering network re-convergence during 
transient network failures. Nevertheless, the traffic rerouting 
from backup to original can result in frequent packet out-of-
order arrivals at a TCP receiver. Duplicate acknowledgements 
(DUP_ACK) generated by the receiver will lead to false fast 
retransmit at the TCP sender and lower the TCP throughput. 
To solve the problem, we proposed a simple algorithm called 
duplicate acknowledgement suppression (DAS). DAS only 
requires a minor modification to the TCP implementation at 
the receiver side, with no change at the sender. In DAS 
algorithm, we suppressed the DUP_ACK when detecting an 
increase in TTL of an out-of-order packet received. As 
compared with plain TCP Newreno, simulation results showed 
that NewReno with our proposed DAS can provide 
considerable amount of improvement in goodput.  
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(b) With a real packet loss on backup path. 
(a) Only due to the path switch. 
(c) With a real packet loss on the original path. 
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